Are incentives for R&D effective? Evidence from a regression discontinuity approach by Raffaello Bronzini & Eleonora Iachini
Temi di Discussione
(Working Papers)
Are incentives for R&D effective?  
Evidence from a regression discontinuity approach




















1   Temi di discussione
(Working papers)
Are incentives for R&D effective?  
Evidence from a regression discontinuity approach
by Raffaello Bronzini and Eleonora Iachini
Number 791 - February 2011The purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial  Board:  Marcello  Pericoli,  Silvia  Magri,  Luisa  Carpinelli,  Emanuela 
Ciapanna, Daniela Marconi, Andrea Neri, Marzia Romanelli, Concetta Rondinelli, 
Tiziano Ropele, Andrea Silvestrini.









This paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of R&D incentives by 
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investment spending of subsidized firms just above the cut-off score with spending by firms 
just below the cut-off. For the sample as a whole we find no significant increase in 
investment as a result of the program. This overall effect, however, masks substantial 
heterogeneity in the program’s impact. On average, we estimate that small enterprises 
increased their investments by about the amount of the subsidy they received from the 
program, whereas for larger firms the subsidies appear to have had no additional effect. 
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Public incentives for private research and development (R&D) are offered in most of 
the advanced countries through direct funding or tax relief. This support is also substantial in 
amount. In the OECD countries direct government funding of business R&D, excluding tax 
incentives, amounts to 0.1% of GDP (OECD, 2008). The economic rationale for R&D 
subsidies, which also justifies their popularity, is based on a market failure argument. One 
justification is that knowledge has a public-good character: it is non-rival and non-
excludable. Firms cannot entirely internalize the effect of R&D activity and positive 
externalities arise. In these circumstances the social return on R&D spending is greater than 
the private return. As a consequence, the equilibrium private investment is lower than the 
optimal social level and subsidies able to increase private R&D will raise social welfare. 
Another justification for R&D incentives is the presence of liquidity constraints. These 
constraints are particularly important for intangible investments, which are subject to 
considerable uncertainty and information asymmetry (see, for example, Bond and Van 
Reenen, 2007; Hall and Lerner, 2009). 
In spite of the popularity of R&D investment subsidies, the question of whether these 
incentives actually work – i.e. increase firms’ R&D activity – remains unsettled. Theory 
predicts that if a program subsidizes marginal projects, incentives will be ineffective because 
they do not trigger additional investment. To be successful a program must target infra-
marginal projects – those that would not occur without the grants.  Empirically, the impact of 
R&D subsidies has been widely studied but previous analyses have yielded very mixed 
results. Out of nineteen micro-econometric studies surveyed by David et al. (2000), half 
found no effect. Examining the papers published in the last decade we found a similar 
balance: out of a total of eleven, just six confirm a positive role for public incentives on 
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R&D activity (see Table A1 in the Appendix for an overview).
2 The main challenge in 
empirical studies arises from the difficulty of inferring a causal effect of subsidies from 
comparisons between subsidized and unsubsidized firms. Subsidy recipients are not 
randomly chosen, rather, recipient and non-recipient firms are likely to differ in both 
observed and unobserved ways that are correlated with the outcome of interest. In this 
context, the variable capturing subsidy recipients is endogenous, and models that fail to 
adequately control for this endogeneity will be biased. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on firms’ R&D subsidies by studying a 
unique program recently implemented in a region of northern Italy (Emilia-Romagna). The 
policy has several key features enabling the effectiveness of R&D incentives to be carefully 
assessed. First, it allows us to address the endogeneity issue with a sharp quasi-experimental 
strategy. The program envisages that, after the assessment of an independent technical 
committee, only eligible projects that receive a certain score are subsidized. Our 
identification strategy takes advantage of the funds’ assignment mechanism. We compare the 
investment of subsidized and unsubsidized firms close to the threshold score using a sharp 
regression discontinuity (RD) design (Hahn et al., 2001). Compared with other methods 
employed in the program evaluation literature this strategy has an important advantage. 
Under general assumptions – in our study firms must not have the capacity to control their 
score completely – the assignment of the subsidy around the threshold is as if it had been 
random, so that the method becomes equivalent to a random experiment (Lee, 2008). Since 
the assumption of the imperfect control of the score has several direct and indirect testable 
implications, the validity of the strategy is also verifiable.  
In addition, the policy’s local dimension allows us to remove much of the unobserved 
heterogeneity among enterprises, and compare recipient and non-recipient firms that are 
more similar than those participating in nationwide programs. In fact, to be eligible a firm 
must both be located and implement the investment in the same region. Meanwhile, we 
focus on a region that is highly representative of the national industry: it is the third largest 
industrial region of the country, covering 11% of Italian firms’ R&D outlays and more than 
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10% of patents. Small and medium-sized enterprises also play a key role in this area, as they 
do throughout the country. 
A third attractive feature is the program’s generosity (in total, about 93 million euros 
have been granted) and its involvement of a large number of firms (1,246 enterprises 
submitted a proposal). In our baseline sample, each subsidized firm received an average of 
182,000 euros; one fourth of the total investment made by each participating firm during the 
two years after the program. The size of the grants and the high participation rate are helpful 
for the evaluation exercise.  
Finally, our assessment permits us to shed light on the effects of place-based policies 
managed by local government.
3 To date these policies have attracted scant attention from the 
evaluation literature, despite absorbing a relatively large share of the total public transfers to 
the private sector.
4 In Italy, from 2000 to 2007 around 18 billion euros were granted to firms 
owing to these programs – one fourth of total public funds assigned to private enterprises. It 
is crucial to know the impact of these policies in order to gain greater awareness of the use of 
public resources. 
Overall we find that the program did not create additional investment. Our results do 
not reject the hypothesis that firms substituted public for privately financed R&D. This 
overall effect, however, masks substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the program. When 
we estimated the effect of the program by firms’ size we find that, unlike large firms, small 
enterprises increased their investment substantially, by on average the same amount of the 
grant received. We also find that for subsidized firms the amount of the grant received in 
relation to the investment programmed did not play a significant role. Our findings are 
robust to multiple sensitivity checks. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
theoretical issues and previous empirical literature. In section 3, we illustrate the features of 
the program. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and the data employed in the 
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evaluation exercise. The main results are shown in section 5. Some extensions of the 
baseline model together with the robustness exercises and the concluding remarks make up 
the final two sections. 
2. Theoretical background and empirical evidence  
Let us first discuss the theoretical issues in a simple static partial equilibrium setting. 
In a perfect capital market, each firm faces a downward sloping marginal return on 
investment schedule (MR) and a horizontal marginal cost of capital schedule (MC) that 
reflects the opportunity cost of the investment. There is a perfectly elastic supply of capital 
so that internal and external funds are perfectly interchangeable. The profit maximizing level 
of investment is such that the marginal cost is equal to the marginal return. In this case, 
public policy is ineffective because the subsidy will not change the investment opportunity 
cost and there will be no increase in investment. By contrast, in an imperfect capital market 
firms face a finance supply schedule that is initially horizontal, reflecting the availability of 
internal funds, and once the internal funds are exhausted it becomes upward sloping (see, for 
example, Bond and Van Reenen, 2007). This is shown by the continuous MC curve in 
Figure 1. The reason why the curve of the supply of finance is increasing is that the degree 
of leverage raises the probability and the severity of financial distress. Moreover, problems 
generated by asymmetric information, such as moral hazard, increase with the amount of 
borrowed funds. In these circumstances a public subsidy will shift the MC schedule to the 
right because it decreases the cost of funds, allowing the firms to substitute public funds for 
more costly private funds. The after-program schedule is represented by the dashed MC 
schedule in Figure 1. The impact of the grant on the firm’s investment depends on the 
position of the MR schedule. If the MR curve intersects the MC curve at a point where the 
latter is horizontal (such as MRA in the figure) the policy will not affect the equilibrium 
investment. The firm will completely substitute public for privately financed R&D to take 
advantage of the cost difference, but it will not change the optimal level of investment 
corresponding to KA*. As in perfect capital markets, the privately financed R&D investment 
will be completely crowded out by the granted R&D expenditure, given that the policy does 
not change the opportunity cost of investment. These are the infra-marginal projects (or 
firms). On the other hand, if the pre-program firm’s equilibrium is in the upward-sloping   
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part of the MC curve (as in the case of MRB), the grant will increase the optimal level of 
investment. Projects that before the program were unprofitable when privately financed 
become profitable after the subsidy, and firm will expand the optimal level of R&D from 
KB* to KB*`. These are the marginal projects (or firms). 
This framework applies to both tangible and intangible investments, like R&D outlays. 
However, it has been argued that in the case of intangible assets liquidity constraints may be 
exacerbated. Informational asymmetries, causing credit constraints, may be amplified 
because R&D projects are riskier and less well understood by non-expert agents than other 
kinds of investment, or because firms may be less willing to share information with 
intermediaries to prevent leaks of knowledge to competitors. Intangible investment could be 
more subject to credit rationing also because financial intermediaries might prefer to finance 
projects related to tangible assets which, in turn, can be offered as collateral, rather than to 
intangible assets that are related only to future streams of profits (see Guiso, 1998; Bond and 
Van Reenen, 2007; Hall and Lerner, 2009). 
Concerning the effectiveness of a program, it is clear that the process of assignment of 
funds plays a critical role, since only programs that subsidize marginal projects will activate 
additional investment. In this regard two considerations ought to be made. First, even 
assuming that public institutions demonstrate excellent ability in choosing the projects to 
subsidize, they may not be perfectly able to discern between marginal and infra-marginal 
ones. Therefore it is likely that, at least in part, funds will be given to infra-marginal 
projects, reducing the effectiveness of the subsidies. Second, institutions might be induced to 
subsidize infra-marginal projects to convince public opinion that the policy is not wasting 
resources, insofar as infra-marginal investments have higher success probabilities and higher 
profitability than marginal ones (see Wallsten, 2000 and Lach, 2002). 
Up to now we focused on direct effects. However, several indirect (general 
equilibrium) effects of the policy might shift the MC or the MR schedules, generating 
multiple potential outcomes. For example, the grant might convey information on the 
profitability of the project and reduce the information asymmetries that subsidized firms 
face, lowering the private costs of capital further. Moreover, thanks to the grants, firms may 
benefit from an expanded or upgraded stock of research facilities, or from better trained 
researchers, both increasing the revenue of other current or future projects, and eventually   
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shifting to the right of the MR schedule. However, there might also be indirect effects acting 
in the opposite direction. For example, if the supply of the R&D inputs is price inelastic, as 
with the supply of researchers in tight local labor markets, and the program is sufficiently 
large, demand shift for inputs triggered by the public program might increase the costs, 
ultimately crowding out the subsidies (see David et al., 2000, and Lach, 2002 for a more 
extensive discussion on indirect effects). 
2.1 Empirical evidence  
The main challenge that empirical studies face in assessing the effectiveness of R&D 
policies is that subsidized firms are not randomly chosen. Rather, they differ from non-
subsidized firms in terms of important unobserved characteristics correlated with the 
outcome variable, so that in the econometric model the variable that identifies subsidized 
firms is endogenous. In recent analyses the endogeneity problem has been addressed mainly 
through matching methods or instrumental variable estimates. However, independently of 
the strategy adopted, the conclusions of earlier studies are mixed.  
Surveying firm-level analyses conducted in the previous three decades, David et al. 
(2000) observe that almost half (9 out of 19) of the policies were not found to trigger 
additional investment while for the other half it was the contrary. More recent evidence is 
similarly non-conclusive. In the case of the Small Business Innovation Research program in 
the U.S. two studies reach opposite conclusions. Matching subsidized and unsubsidized 
firms by industry and size, Lerner (1999) finds that the policy increased sales and 
employment of subsidized firms; by contrast Wallsten (2000), using the amount of public 
funds available for each type of R&D investment in each year as an instrument for the 
subsidy, shows that grants did not lead to an increase in employment and that the public 
subsidy crowded out firm-financed R&D dollar for dollar. The evidence available for other 
countries is also mixed. For Israel, Lach (2002) finds that grants created additional R&D 
investment for small firms but, since the greatest share of the subsidies was given to large 
firms that did not make additional investment, the overall impact was null. He compared the 
performance of subsidized and non-subsidized firms using difference-in-difference (DID) 
estimates and controlling for several observables. Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) use matching 
strategies to study R&D subsidies in Eastern Germany, finding an overall positive and   
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significant effect on investment. Gonzalez et al. (2005) examine the effects of R&D policies 
in Spain, estimating simultaneously the probability of obtaining a subsidy, assuming a set of 
firms’ observables as pre-determined (e.g. size, age, industry, location, capital growth), and 
the impact of the grant on investment. They find a positive, albeit very small, effect on 
private investment that turns out to be significantly larger for small firms. Gorg and Strobl 
(2007) combining the matching method with DID estimation find that in Ireland only small 
grants had additional effects on private R&D investment, while large grants crowded out 
private investment. Finally, Hussinger (2008) uses two-step selection models showing that in 
Germany public subsidies were effective in promoting firms’ R&D investment.
5 
3. The program 
In 2003 the government of Emilia-Romagna implemented the “Regional Program for 
Industrial Research, Innovation and Technological Transfer” putting into effect Regional 
Law no. 7/2002, art. 4 (see: Bollettino Ufficiale della Regione  no. 64 of 14 May 2002 and 
Delibera della Giunta Regionale no. 2038 of 20 October 2003). The program aims at 
sustaining firms’ industrial research and pre-competitive development – the activity 
necessary to convert the output of research into a plan, project or design for the realization of 
new products or processes or the improvement of existing ones – in the region. The 
geographic area covered by the policy is described in Figure A1 in the Appendix. According 
to the program, the regional government subsidizes the R&D expenditure of eligible firms 
through grants. The grant may cover up to 50% of the costs for industrial research projects 
and 25% for pre-competitive development projects; the 25% limit is extended by an 
additional 10% if applicants are small or medium-sized enterprises. Eligible firms – 
including temporary associations or consortia – are those that have an operative main office 
and intend to implement the project in the region. Several types of outlays, related to the 
                                                           
5  The empirical literature includes also Busom (2000), who finds that public funds led to more private 
expenditure in Spain, even if she cannot exclude that crowding out occurred for 30% of participants; 
Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002), who show how public-sponsored research consortia increased the patenting 
activity of Japanese firms in a consortium; Hujer and Radic (2005), who examine the impact of public subsidies 
on firms’ innovation propensity in Germany, finding a positive impact only for Eastern Germany. In Italy, 
Merito et al. (2007) show that subsidies had no impact on post-program employment levels, productivity or 
sales of the subsidized firms with respect to matched untreated ones. See also the surveys by Klette et al. 
(2000) and Hall and Van Reenen (2000).    
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eligible project, can be subsidized: a) costs for machinery and equipment; b) software; c) 
registration of patents; d) employment of researchers; e) the use of laboratories; f) contracts 
with research centers; g) consulting; h) feasibility studies; i) licenses and external costs for 
the realization of prototypes. To be eligible, projects must be worth at least 150,000 euros; 
the maximum grant per project is 250,000 euros. The investment can last from 12 to 24 
months, but the period can be extended. Subsidies are transferred to the firms either after the 
completion of the project, or in two installments, one at the completion of 50% of the project 
and the other once the project is completed. 
One important characteristic of the program is that firms cannot receive other types of 
public subsidies for the same project. This helps the evaluating process given that the impact 
of the regional program cannot be confused with that of other public subsidies.  
The grants are assigned after a process of assessment of the projects carried out by a 
committee of independent experts appointed by the Regional Government. For the 
evaluation process the committee may benefit from the assessment of independent 
evaluators. The committee examines the projects and assigns a score for each of the 
following elements: a) technological and scientific (max. 45 points); b) financial and 
economic (max. 20 points); c) managerial (max. 20 points); d) regional impact (max. 15 
points).
6 Only projects assessed as sufficient in each profile, and that obtain a total score 
equal to or more than 75 points receive the grants (the maximum score is 100). For the 
evaluation process, both the committee and the independent evaluators must comply with the 
general principles for the evaluation of research specified by the Ministry of Education, 
University and Research of the Italian Government and the general principles of the 
European Commission.
7  
                                                           
6 Point (a) includes: the degree of innovation of the project and the adequacy of the technical and scientific 
resources provided; point (b): the congruence between the financial plan and the objectives of the project; point 
(c): past experience collected in similar projects or the level of managerial competence; point (d): regional 
priorities indicated in the Regional Law such as projects involving universities and the hiring of new qualified 
personnel. 
7 See the Linee guida per la valutazione della ricerca, Comitato di indirizzo per la valutazione della ricerca – 
Ministry of Education, University and Research; and Orientamenti concernenti le procedure di valutazione e di 
selezione delle proposte nell’ambito del VI Programma quadro per la ricerca e lo sviluppo tecnologico, 
European Commission.  More information on the evaluation process, procedures and principles are reported in 
the Delibera della Giunta regionale no. 2822/2003.   
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To date, two auctions have been implemented. The first application deadline was in 
February 2004, the second in September 2004, and the evaluation process terminated in June 
2004 and June 2005, respectively.
8 Overall, a total of about 93 million euros has been 
granted, corresponding to 0.1% of regional GDP (the same ratio as that between assistance 
to private R&D and GDP in the national average). Total planned investment equalled 235.5 
million euros. For the industrial firms in our sample used for the estimates grants averaged 
182,000 euros, one fourth of the total investment made by each participating firm during the 
two years after the program. 
4. Empirical strategy and data 
4.1 Empirical strategy 
Our goal is to evaluate whether subsidized firms would not have made the same 
amount of R&D outlays without the grants. A typical issue of the program evaluation 
literature is that subsidized and non-subsidized firms can differ in terms of unobserved 
characteristics correlated with the outcome. Therefore, the variable identifying recipient 
firms in the econometric models can be endogenous and we have to adopt a strategy that 
addresses this endogeneity to identify correctly the effect of the program. We take advantage 
of the funds’ assignment mechanism. As described above, the committee of experts assigned 
a score to each project and only those receiving a score greater than or equal to a given 
threshold were awarded grants (75 points out of 100). We apply a sharp regression 
discontinuity (RD) design comparing the performance between subsidized and non-
subsidized firms that have a score close to the threshold. By letting the outcome variable be a 
function of the score, the average treatment effect of the program is assessed through the 
estimated value of the discontinuity at the threshold.  
In the last decade a growing number of empirical studies in economics have utilized 
the RD design, since the seminal contributions by Angrist and Lavy (1999), Black (1999) 
                                                           
8 See the Delibera della Giunta Regionale no. 1205 of 21 June 2004 and no. 1021 of 27 June 2005.   
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and van der Klaauw (2002).
9 This strategy is deemed preferable to other non-experimental 
methods to control for the endogeneity of treatment because, under rather general conditions, 
it is possible to demonstrate that it is equivalent to a randomized experiment. The 
identification strategy relies on the continuity assumption, which requires that firms in a 
neighborhood just below and just above the cut-off point have the same potential outcome in 
an identical funding experience. Even though there is no direct way of testing the validity of 
the continuity hypothesis, Lee (2008) formally shows that if the treatment depends on 
whether a (forcing) variable exceeds a known threshold and agents cannot precisely control 
the forcing variable, the continuity assumption is satisfied since the variation in treatment 
around the cut-off is randomized, as if the agents had been randomly drawn just below or 
just above the cut-off. In this scenario, the impact of the program is identified by the 
discontinuity of the outcome variable at the cut-off point (Hahn et al. 2001). 
RD design is suitable in contexts where the agents cannot perfectly manipulate the 
forcing variable (the score). We believe that in our situation this strategy is appropriate, in 
that it is hard to argue that firms participating in the program can completely control their 
score. In any event, the randomization assumption has testable implications. If a subsidy is 
random around the threshold, treated and untreated firms close to the threshold will be 
similar (more than those distant from the cut-off). The similarity of the two groups is a 
consequence of randomization and not vice versa (Lee, 2008). Therefore, we can assess the 
validity of the design by verifying whether differences in treated and control firms’ 
observables become negligible close to the cut-off point. Moreover, there are indirect ways 
of testing the validity of the crucial continuity assumption, by checking whether other 
covariates, or the outcome variable in the absence of the program, are continuous across the 
threshold. We will present the results of these tests in section 6.  
Since under the RD method results can be sensitive to some arbitrary choices, such as 
the functional form or the interval around the cut-off point used in the local regressions, we 
use multiple functional forms and econometric models for robustness purposes. 
                                                           
9 See Lee and Lemieux (2009) and the monographic number of the Journal of Econometrics, vol. 142(2), 2008.   
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Several econometric models have been suggested to test for the discontinuity at the 
cut-off point (see amongst others: Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2009). 
Here we use both parametric and non-parametric methods. First, we estimate up to a third 
order polynomial model on the full sample:
10 
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1                (1) 
where Yi is the outcome variable; Ti=1 if firm i is subsidized (all firms with Scorei >=75) and 
Ti =0 otherwise; Si =Scorei-75; the parameters of the score function (γp and γ’p) are allowed 
to be different on the opposite side of the cut-off to allow for heterogeneity of the function 
across the threshold; i is the random error. We also test the mean difference between treated 
and untreated firms (polynomial of order 0). 
Second, equation (1) has been estimated through local regressions around the cut-off 
point using two different sample windows. The wide-window includes 50% of the baseline 
sample (firms with scores between 52 and 80); the narrow-window includes 35% of the 
baseline sample (scores in the 66-78 range). The ranges have been chosen to (almost) 
balance the number of firms to the left and right side of the threshold. Third, we estimated 
the discontinuity using other non-parametric techniques, namely the Epanechnikov kernel 
regressions using two bandwidths, 30 and 15 points of the score (see section 6). 
If model (1) is correctly specified, the OLS estimate of the parameter  measures the 
value of the discontinuity of function Y(Si) at the cut-off point, corresponding to the unbiased 
estimate of the causal effect of the program. For the inference, however, a word of caution is 
necessary. Since our forcing variable is discrete (the score can assume only integer values) 
random disturbances can be correlated within the group (similarly to the cases discussed by 
Moulton, 1990). In our study the groups are represented by firms that received the same 
score. In these circumstances standard errors could be downward biased and spurious 
statistical significance may occur. To correct for this bias we clustered the heteroskedasticity 
                                                           
10 Higher orders of polynomials were rejected by standard model selection criteria (Akaike Information 
Criterion and Schwartz Bayesian Criterion). Studies that adopt similar models include Card et al. (2007) and 
Lalive (2008).   
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robust standard errors by the values of the score S (Lee and Card, 2008). In the kernel 
regressions standard errors are clustered and bootstrapped.  
4.2  Outcome variables and data  
Regarding outcome variables, one potential candidate is R&D investment. However, 
reliable data on R&D outlays are normally gathered directly from the firms through specific 
surveys and in our case are unavailable. Therefore, we adopt a different strategy. We build 
the analysis on balance-sheet data provided by the CERVED, which collects information on  
Italian corporations. From the balance sheets we take as outcome variables those items that 
are associated with R&D outlays reimbursable by the program and listed above in section 3. 
The rationale is that if the program allowed outlays that without the grant would not have 
been made, we should observe a significant increase in at least one of these items for the 
recipient firms after the program, relative to those of non-recipient firms. More specifically, 
since the main reimbursable outlays refer to tangible and intangible investment (see section 
3; those labeled a, b and c), we take the inv estm ent as the first (and favored) outcome 
variable.
11 However, other reimbursable outlays are those related to the employment of 
researchers (point d). Thus, we use two additional outcome variables: labor costs and level 
of employment. Thanks to the program, labor costs may increase because firms hire 
additional employees and/or because they substitute high-skilled employees (researchers) for 
low-skilled employees. Employment - available in our data set only for a sub-sample of 
firms - enables further light to be shed on the effect of the program on labor input. Finally, 
since other minor costs listed in section 3 refer to the services bought by the firms for R&D 
projects (see points e to i), we take the services’ costs as our last outcome variable. This 
strategy permits us to distinguish the effect on the different types of R&D expenditure.  
To sum up, we assessed the impact of the program on the following outcome variables: 
investment (total, tangible and intangible), labor costs, level of employment and service 
costs. All the variables are accumulated from the year of the assignment up to two years 
                                                           
11 The law does not specify how R&D outlays must be booked in the balance sheets. If the costs are related to 
the development of a specific product, productive process, or the application of innovations that have multiyear 
utility, they are usually booked among investments. 
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afterwards (the expected period of the project’s realization), to detect the whole R&D 
activity potentially related to the subsidized investment. Moreover, except employment, they 
are scaled by the pre-program sales (first pre-assignment year). Employment is not scaled 
but in log. Finally, to avoid results being driven by outliers – especially for investment that 
are highly volatile over time and uneven across firms – we trimmed the sample according to 
the 5
th and 95
th percentile of the distribution of Total  investmenti/Salesi (also trimming 
investment over assets does not substantially change the results). 
The balance-sheet data have been combined with the data set provided by the Emilia-
Romagna Region that includes a limited amount of information on participating firms, but 
that is nonetheless crucial for the evaluation exercise: such as name, score, investment 
planned, grants assigned, subsidies revoked and renunciations. 
To date two auctions have been concluded, in 2004 and 2005. We pool together the 
data of the two auctions. Overall 1,246 firms participated (557 treated and 689 untreated). 
Given that our empirical strategy is based on the score assigned to each firm we had to 
exclude 411 unsubsidized firms that did not receive a score in the second auction because 
their projects were deemed insufficient under (at least) one profile. Note that the strategy is 
based on the test for discontinuity around the cut-off point, and plausibly omitted firms 
would have received a total score distant from the cut-off, thus we believe that their 
exclusion did not bias our results. 
Having linked information on participating firms provided by the Region with the 
balance-sheet data set, and having cleaned the sample, we ended up with a full sample of 357 
industrial firms (254 treated and 103 untreated) and 111 services firms (of which 61 
treated).
12 The sample covers the large majority of the grants. In the sample used for the 
estimates, overall recipient firms received 66% per cent of the total funds granted; if we 
include outliers of the trimmed tails the coverage ratio reaches 94%.
13 However, since start-
                                                           
12 We were able to link 750 of the scored firms (499 subsidized and 251 unsubsidized) with the balance sheet 
data set. Other applicants are missing because, for example, they were not corporations, were start-ups or 
because of misprints of the firms’ identifying data. Next, we excluded firms involved in renunciations and 
revocations (114 firms), 3 firms from the energy and mining sectors together with firms that have sales or 
assets equal to 0 and firms unsubsidized in the first auction but subsidized in the second. As mentioned earlier 
we also excluded the 5° and 95° percentile of our key outcome variable (investment over pre-assignment sales).  
13 Renunciations and revocations, which cover only a minor part of the total grants, are excluded.    
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ups and very small enterprises are underrepresented in our data, we are aware that our 
findings could not apply to these categories of firms. Finally, given that the remarkable 
heterogeneity between industrial and service firms, and within the service industry (which 
includes, for example, professional offices, transport and real estate), might produce large 
noise in our data, we focused on industrial firms (manufacturing and construction) and 
present the results of the baseline model for services only as an extension. 
In Table 1 the distribution of firms by sector is reported. We notice that there is a large 
concentration of firms within just two sectors: machinery and chemicals together absorb two 
thirds of the firms’ sample. The former is a sector of regional specialization, but also 
represents the main industrial sector in Italian industry as a whole. The concentration of 
firms in a few sectors reinforces our evaluation exercise, in that it allows us to compare 
homogeneous firms. Moreover, because of the exclusion of the non-scored applicant firms 
from the second auction, treated firms are more than double the number of untreated ones, 
while the proportion of treated and untreated firms is pretty well balanced within each sector. 
Table 2 shows the means of several observables in the year before the assignment of 
funds for treated and untreated firms. We notice that treated firms are substantially larger 
than untreated firms overall, as shown by mean differences of sales, valued added and assets. 
A significant, and potentially worrying, difference arises also for firms’ self-financing 
capabilities, measured by cash flow over sales. However, when we restrict the sample to 
around the cut-off, using both the wide and narrow band described above, treated and 
untreated firms become more alike. In particular the improvement is notable for size and 
self-financing power. Now differences between the two groups are remarkably smaller and 
never statistically significant. 
In Figure 2 the density function of the sample by score is shown. We notice that it is 
higher on the right-hand side of the threshold because of the cited exclusion of non-scored 
untreated firms in the second auction, and that density increases substantially around the cut-
off point. We observe, however, that just at the score below the cut-off (score=74) the 
density is lower than at slightly more distant values. We do not interpret this drop as the 
signal that firms just below the threshold were able to manipulate their score. Rather, we 
believe that the commission of experts avoided assigning a score just below the threshold for 
understandable reasons. This record could have been perceived as particularly annoying by   
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dismissed firms and potentially would have left more room for appeals against the decision. 
If any, this evidence shows that the commission enjoys a certain degree of discretion in 
assigning the score, a characteristic of the assessment that does not invalidate our design. 
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline results 
We first present the estimations of the coefficient  of model (1) using total, tangible 
and intangible investment scaled by sales as outcome variables. Since we do not observe 
private investment but total investment, let us briefly discuss how to interpret the results. A 
coefficient  equal to zero would signal complete crowding-out of private investment by 
public grant: firms reduced private expenditure by the same amount of the subsidies and the 
investment turned out to be unaffected by the program. On the other hand a positive 
coefficient would show that overall treated firms invested more than untreated firms, 
plausibly thanks to the program, and that total crowding-out did not occur. However, it is 
still possible that firms partially substituted public for private financed R&D outlays. In 
order to evaluate if partial crowding-out, or on the contrary even crowding-in, occurred – 
that is if public subsidies have triggered private financed investment – we have to compare 
the change in total investment with the grants. 
Before showing the econometric results let us present the scatter plot of the (averaged 
by score) outcome variables against the score (Figure 3). As expected, the figure shows 
rather dispersed points, given that investment is usually greatly uneven across firms. 
Apparently, the interpolation lines are almost flat, showing a weak dependence of the overall 
outcome on the score. As matter of fact, no remarkable jumps of the outcome variable at the 
threshold emerge from the figures; however, if anything, the impact seems somewhat 
positive.  
This perception is confirmed by the econometric estimates of the coefficient β shown 
in Table 3. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests a preference for more parsimonious 
models, namely simple mean differences, rather than a higher order of polynomials in all 
cases but one. The sign of the coefficient is almost always positive. Using the full sample as   
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a benchmark, the jump turns out to be equal to about 1/3 of the mean of the outcome variable 
of the untreated firms. Due to the sample variance, however, the discontinuity is almost 
never statistically significant (the coefficient is weakly significant in just 4 out of 30 
models). Local estimates generate similar results to those of the full sample. 
It is possible that we were unable to detect any effect because, for example, firms had 
used the grants for hiring researchers or for consulting contracts. To check for this 
eventuality we test for the discontinuity of labor and services costs, using these as further 
outcome variables. Moreover, we change the scale variable for investment using capital and 
total assets to check the sensitiveness of our previous findings on investment. The results of 
these exercises are reported in Table 4. Labor costs almost always have a negative sign, but 
only rarely is the coefficient statistically significant. With regard to service costs, the 
discontinuity is never significant and the sign is not stable across model’s specifications. The 
previous results do not even seem affected by the variable used to scale investment; even 
though in some models the coefficient now turns out to be statistically significant. Finally, 
we estimated the effect of the incentives on the (log of) employment on a sub-sample of 
firms that reported such information (263 out of 357). Table A4 in the appendix displays the 
results (see the first three columns; in the local regressions we use only the wide window 
because of the sample size). Overall it seems that the level of employment did not change 
thanks to the program: the coefficients are almost never statistically significant. 
On the whole, the results show that the effectiveness of the program is questionable.  
We cannot reject the hypothesis of complete crowding-out of private investment and we do 
not observe any significant impact of the policy on the other variables potentially affected by 
the program. 
5.2 Results by firms’ size 
So far we have not found evidence of effectiveness of the public subsidies. It is 
possible, however, that even if overall crowding-out occurred, for firms for whom the cost 
premium of external finance was greater, the subsidies created additional investment. In the 
literature on capital market imperfection, it has been argued that among the firms that may 
have worse access to capital markets are the small ones. First, because information   
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asymmetries are strengthened for small enterprises, given that they are less visible, usually 
younger, and the capabilities of their management less well-known. Second, small firms 
often lack sufficient collateral. Third, their production is usually less diversified and, as a 
consequence, their earnings may be more volatile. For all these reasons they are more 
dependent on external finance and, at the same time, less able than larger firms to raise funds 
from the capital market. Empirically, the negative relationship between financial constraints 
and firms’ size has been supported by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995) and Beck et al. (2005), amongst others, although other studies have 
questioned it (see, for example: Guiso, 1998 and Audretsch and Elston, 2002). 
If liquidity constraints are amplified for innovative investment and small firms have 
less access to financing, the effectiveness of innovation subsidies could be inversely related 
to the size of firms. Some of the previous empirical evidence tends to support this hypothesis 
(e.g. Lach, 2002 and Gonzalez et al., 2005). To test for a heterogeneous causal effect of the 
program across firms’ size we estimated the following model, where the firms’ size 
dummies are interacted with the treatment dummy and the score: 
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1 1        (2) 
 where Sizei
1=1 if the value added of firm i is below the median and zero otherwise (Small); 
Sizei
2=1 if the value added is above the median and zero otherwise (Large).
14 Notice that the 
model allows for heterogeneous parameters between small and large firms across the 
threshold through the interaction of the dummy treatment and size. In model (2) the 
parameter k is the estimate of the causal effect of the program for firms of size k. 
Before showing the results by size of firms, let us verify whether treated and untreated 
firms are similar in the two sub-samples of large and small enterprises. In Tables A2 in the 
appendix we display the distribution of firms by size, sector and treatment. In Table A3 we 
report mean differences of various observables for treated and untreated firms by size. The 
tables show that in each category of firm there are no significant differences in the 
                                                           
14 The results are not sensitive to the choice of the variable used to measure size. We have replicated the 
estimates using sales, instead of value added, obtaining results that are almost undistinguishable from those 
presented in the table.   
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distribution of treated and untreated firms across sectors. Moreover, in our sample small 
(large) treated firms are greatly similar to small (large) untreated ones around the cut-off in 
terms of several observables. This evidence supports the implementation of our strategy also 
for each firms’ sub-sample. 
Figures 4 and 5 outline the investment by sale against the score for the two groups. 
Again, from the figures emerge the independence of the investment from the score. The 
effect seems null for large firms but positive and rather substantial for small ones. In Table 5 
we show the results of the estimates of model (2) on investment. For small firms the impact 
turns out to be positive and statistically significant. This result is robust to the choice of both 
functional form and sample: the discontinuity is positive and significant in the full sample 
(Panel A) and in the local regressions (Panel B and C). Only in the smallest sample when we 
used the quadratic model, the parameter turns out to be statically non-significant, arguably 
because of the loss of efficiency. By contrast, for large firms we find mainly negative but 
non-statistically significant coefficients.  
Interestingly enough, the impact seems rather balanced between investment in tangible 
and intangible assets: the coefficients turn out to be rather similar among the two types of 
investment. Therefore, it seems that intangible and physical capital investment have been 
mostly complementary. 
For small firms the effect of the program appears remarkable. If we take as our 
benchmark the estimates by the polynomial of order 0, as AIC suggests, in the full sample 
the increase in investment is twice the mean of investment of untreated firms, around 40% of 
its standard deviation. Even if it seems like an exceptional increase, we have to take into 
account that the grants have been substantial (for the small firms on average equal to 173 
thousand euros) especially if compared to the investment of untreated firms (107 thousand 
euros on average).  
We replicated the estimates using labor and services costs as outcome variables. Table 
6 shows that both types of cost did not change because of the program, neither for small 
firms nor for large ones. Finally, we verified the effects of the incentives on the (log of) 
employment. The results are displayed in Table A4 in the appendix. While they seem 
sensitive to the model chosen and the estimation strategy used, overall we can conclude that   
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not even employment changed thanks to the program; again the results are slightly more 
favorable for small firms. 
In order to measure more accurately the impact of the policy on small firms’ 
investment and to understand if partial crowding-out, or in contrast crowding-in, occurred, 
we re-estimated model (2), regressing total investment on the grants disbursed to the firms 
(instead of on the treatment dummy variable T): 
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(3) 
A coefficient βk positive and smaller (larger) than one would indicate that on average 
partial crowding-out (crowding-in) occurred; i.e. the change in the investment produced by 
the subsidy was smaller (larger) than the grant; a coefficient equal to one implies that the 
increase of the investment was equal to the subsidy received. 
The estimations of βk in model (3) are reported in Table 5 (last three columns). For 
small firms we find a parameter very close to one in the polynomial of order 0 (equivalent to 
the mean difference); in the linear model or higher order polynomial models the coefficient 
increases in magnitude. Yet, the hypothesis of βsmall equal to one is largely accepted by t-
tests (calculated with robust standard errors clustered by score) in all models. Therefore, it 
seems that small firms have increased their total investment outlays after, and owing to, the 
program exactly by the same amount of the grants received. On the other hand, grants to 
larger firms completely displaced private expenditure, probably because they possess 
sufficient internal financial resources and have better access to the credit market to finance 
their innovation outlays.  
To verify this interpretation, we observe some indexes plausibly correlated to firms’ 
internal and external financial capability. We calculate for industrial firms of our full sample 
the mean of: the own capital/debts ratio, reflecting the capability of the firms to provide 
collaterals; the cash flows over sales and ROA, showing the ability of the firms to finance 
investment with internal funds; the financial costs over total debts as a proxy of the interest   
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rate paid by the firms for external funds. As reported in Table 7, all the indexes turn out to be 
on average worse for small firms. For cash flow and ROA the gap of small firms is also 
statistically significant. This evidence tends to supports the interpretation that the program 
was effective for small firms because they were more dependent on, and plausibly have more 
limited access to, external finance than larger firms. 
6. Extensions and robustness checks 
In this section we present some extensions of our previous model and the robustness 
exercises run to test the validity of our empirical design and the sensitiveness of our results. 
First of all, we investigated how firms in the services sector reacted to the subsidies, thus we 
re-estimated model (1) and (2) only for participating firms belonging to the services sector. 
The results are presented in Table 8. Given that service firms are less numerous we only 
used the wide-window sample for local regressions. Overall, the results obtained for 
industrial enterprises are confirmed for those of services. We do not find any positive effect 
of the policy on the whole sample, but when we split it by firms’ size we find again that the 
impact is positive and mostly significant for small firms, while it is negative and only rarely 
statistically significant for large ones (labor and service costs did not change because of the 
program; results are not shown but available upon request). 
A relatively little-studied topic in the evaluation literature, yet one which appears 
important for designing effective policies, is the role played by the share of investment 
covered by the grant (coverage ratio). It is possible that for firms with a high coverage ratio 
subsidies could be more effective than for those with a small coverage ratio. For a program 
that supported tangible investment in Italy, Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) found that 
investment by firms with a high coverage ratio increased significantly with respect to those 
of the untreated firms, while for those with a low coverage ratio the rise was not significant. 
For the same program, Adorno et al. (2007) showed that the coverage ratio of subsidies had 
a non-linear impact on investment: up to a certain point subsidies grew along with the 
coverage ratio, but after a certain point the relation reversed.    
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The exercise is based on the estimation of the following model: 
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where Intens
1=High and Intens
2=Low.  High (Low) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
grant/investment ratio of firms i is higher (lower) than the median of the overall firms’ 
distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
Before describing the results, let us present some descriptive statistics of the grant 
intensity variable. Its distribution looks like a normal with mean and median equal to 0.40. 
In our sample there is little variation across firms: the standard deviation is 0.05; the 25
th and 
75
th percentiles are equal, respectively, to 0.38 and 0.43. As a consequence, firms above and 
below the median turn out to be rather homogeneous in terms of the coverage ratio. The 
estimates of model (4) are reported in Table 9. We notice that the coefficients are almost 
always positive, for both low and high grant-intensity firms, but only sometimes statistically 
significant. Rather surprisingly, the coefficients of low grant-intensity firms turn out to be 
usually larger than those of high ones. These differences, however, are often negligible and 
not statistically significant. For example, in 5 out of 9 models estimated on total investment 
the null of equality of the coefficients for low and high grants coverage ratio is accepted by a 
standard F-test. On the whole, we are inclined to believe that the intensity of the grant did 
not play a significant role in the program examined. 
In the remaining part of the section we present some robustness checks of our main 
findings, carried out on the sample of industrial firms. As a first check, we introduce pre-
treatment firm-observables in model (1) and (2) to increase the precision of our estimates 
and correct for potential imbalances between treated and untreated firms that might be 
correlated with the outcome variable, for example differences in sectoral composition. This 
imbalance might be larger in the exercise with the sample split, when the number of firms is 
reduced. The covariates introduced consist of 2-digit sectoral dummies and some 
observables that in principle may be correlated with the investment: gross operative   
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margin/sales (a measure of operative profitability), cash flows/sales (proxy of the self-
financing capability), own capital/debts (measuring the leverage), financial costs/debts 
(proxy of the cost of borrowing), ROA and total assets (measures of size). All variables refer 
to the pre-treatment period. The results shown in Table 10 are remarkably similar to the 
baseline ones. The coefficients turn out to be close in magnitude to those previously 
estimated and highly statistically significant for small firms. 
In addition, we verify whether our main results depend on the estimation methods. 
Therefore, we run kernel regressions of model (1) and (2) using the Epanechnikov kernel, 
several polynomials and different bandwidths: 30 and 15 points of the score (below and 
above the threshold). Results shown in tables A4 and A5 in the appendix confirm those 
previously obtained. The coefficients are significant only for the investment of small firms 
and very close in their magnitude to the earlier ones. By using the triangular kernel or 
different bandwidths we obtained similar findings. 
RD identification strategy relies on the continuity assumption, which requires that 
potential outcome should be smooth around the cut-off point in the absence of the 
program. There is no direct way to verify this hypothesis. However, we can run some 
indirect tests. A first one is to verify if some firms’ covariates that in principle should not 
be affected by the treatment (at least in the short run) are continuous at the cut-off. If we 
do not observe jumps it is plausible that also the outcome variable would have been 
continuous without treatment. The exercise is run using the following observables that 
could, in principle, be correlated with investment: profitability (ROA), net assets over 
debts, the cash flow over sales and costs of debts (interest costs over debts). We replicated 
the estimates of model (2) using these covariates as outcomes. We almost never find 
significant discontinuities (Table 11). 
Another indirect way to test for the continuity assumption is to verify whether the 
outcome variable before the program was smooth across the cut-off. If we observe a smooth 
function before the program took place, it is plausible that the jump we observe after the 
program is due to the subsidy. Therefore, we re-estimated model (2) using as outcome 
variable the investment in the period before the program. Notice that since in the baseline 
exercise we accumulated the investment over some years after the program, to make the 
robustness exercise as comparable to the baseline estimates as possible we accumulated the   
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investment over the two years before the program. Table 12 (section 1) and Figure 5 show 
that before the program there were no jumps in investment. 
Finally, we check whether there are discontinuities of investment at score values other 
than the cut-off point. If the jump of the function is unique, at the point that divides 
subsidized from unsubsidized firms, the evidence in favor of the causality effect of the 
program becomes more persuasive. We implement the following test suggested by Lee and 
Lemieux (2009). We estimate the baseline model (2) adding a complete set of score 
dummies variable interacted with the small dummy. Then we test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of these dummies are jointly not statistically different from zero. If we accept 
the null, we can conclude that there are no other jumps of the investment: the only one is at 
the threshold. Table 12 (section 2) reports the values of the F-test of this exercise. From the 
table it is evident that no other discontinuities are detected. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the effects of incentives for firms’ 
R&D investment. We evaluated the impact of a place-based program implemented recently 
in a region of northern Italy. Using a sharp regression discontinuity strategy we find that 
overall grants did not have a positive effect on firms’ R&D outlays. However, when we 
differentiate firms by size, we find that for small firms the grants triggered substantial 
additional investment, while for large ones they did not. The change in investment of small 
firms has been on average equal to the subsidy received. Overall, our results are similar to 
the conclusions reached by Lach (2002) and Gonzalez et al. (2005). We argue that it could 
be the lower capability of smaller firms to raise funds on the capital market that can explain 
our findings. In our sample, several financial indexes show how smaller enterprises may 
have had more restricted access to the credit market than larger ones.  
We analyzed the direct effects of the policy on the main target variables. Of course, 
there are further interesting issues that we did not address but that deserve attention. A first 
one is the long-term effect of the grants in terms of the economic performance of recipient 
firms. Other important issues are the indirect effects of the program. Among them, the 
presence of spillovers is one of the most significant. An increase in R&D investment might   
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produce positive spillovers across firms that, in terms of social welfare, could even offset the 
cost of having unsuccessfully financed larger enterprises. For regional programs an 
interesting question is also to know whether spillovers are localized. To understand these 
effects would be highly rewarding, albeit empirically challenging.   
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Figure 1 
INVESTMENT COSTS AND RETURNS IN AN 
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Figure 2 
FIRMS’ DENSITY DISTRIBUTION BY SCORE 
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Figure 3 





   
  35
Figure 4 
LARGE FIRMS  
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Figure 5 
SMALL FIRMS  
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PRE-PROGRAM INVESTMENT – SMALL FIRMS  
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DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY SECTOR 
Number of firms  Percentages 
Sector 
Treated Untreated  Treated  Untreated 
       
Food, beverages and tobacco  18 5 7.1  6.4 
Textiles, wearing apparel, leather 
products  4 3  1.6  2.0 
Paper, printing and publishing  3 1  1.2  1.1 
Chemical products  28 9  11.0  10.4 
Non-metallic mineral products  10 4 3.9  3.9 
Basic metal industries  20 12 7.9  9.0 
Machinery and equipment  146 58 57.5  57.1 
Transport equipment  16 3 6.3  5.3 
Other manufacturing industries, 
wood and wood furniture  4 6  1.6  2.8 
Construction  5 2  2.0  2.0 
Total industrial firms  254 103 100.0  100.0 
   




PRE-ASSIGNMENT MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATION) AND MEAN-DIFFERENCES (STANDARD ERRORS) 
All  50% cut-off neighborhood sample 
(score 52-80) 
35% cut-off neighborhood sample  
(score 66-78)  Variable 
Untreated Treated  Mean  
Diff.  Untreated Treated  Mean 
Diff.  Untreated Treated  Mean 
Diff. 











































































































































































































































Notes: only manufacturing and construction firms. All the variables refer to the first pre-assignment year (2003 for the first auction and 2004 for the second). In the complete sample 254 firms 
are treated; 103 are untreated. In the 50% cut-off neighborhood sample treated firms are 90, untreated 81; in the 35% cut-off neighborhood sample treated firms are 57, untreated 58. 
Investments are calculated as the difference between the capital stock in two consecutive years.  




BASELINE RESULTS: EFFECT OF THE PROGRAM ON INVESTMENT 








     
  































































































Mean (st. dev.) for 









Notes: The table shows the estimates of the coefficient  of model (1) for industrial firms. Investments are accumulated over 
the first 3 years after the assignment (including that of the assignment); sales refer to the pre-assignment year. The polynomial 
of order 0 is the difference in mean between treated and untreated. All the samples have been trimmed according to the 5th 
and 95th percentile of the distribution of the Total investment/Sales ratio (calculated over the full sample). Robust standard 
errors clustered by score in round brackets. Akaike Information Criterion in squared brackets. Number of observations: 357 in 
Panel A; 171 in Panel B; 115 in Panel C.  
*, **,***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 4 
BASELINE RESULTS: EFFECT OF THE PROGRAM ON OTHER 
OUTCOME VARIABLES  










      





























































































































Mean (st. dev.) for 












Notes: The table shows the estimates of the coefficient  of model (1) using different outcome variables. 
Investments are accumulated over the first 3 years after the assignment (including that of the assignment); sales and 
assets refer to the pre-assignment year. The polynomial of order 0 is the difference in mean between treated and 
untreated. All the samples have been trimmed according to the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution of the 
Total investment/Sales ratio (calculated over the whole sample). Robust standard errors clustered by score in round 
brackets. Akaike Information Criterion in squared brackets. Number of observations: 357 in Panel A; 171 in Panel 
B; 115 in Panel C.  
*, **,***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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Table 5 
EFFECT OF THE PROGRAM ON INVESTMENT BY FIRMS’ SIZE 
  Model (2)  Model (3) 
Total investment/Sales  Tangible investment/Sales Intangible  investment/Sales Total  investment 
Order of  
polynomial 
Small Large  AIC Small  Large AIC Small  Large AIC Small  Large  t-test of 
βsmall=1 
               













































































































































































Mean (st. dev.) 
for untreated 





(0.112)    0.012 
(0.076) 
0.033 




     
Notes: The table shows the estimates of the coefficients k of model (2) and model (3). AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion. Small [Large] firms are those falling in the first [second] half of the 
distribution of the value added. See, also, the notes to Table 3. 




EFFECT OF THE PROGRAM ON DIFFERENT OUTCOME VARIABLES 
BY FIRMS’ SIZE 
 
 
Labor costs/Sales  Service costs/Sales 
Order of  
polynomial 
Small Large  AIC  Small Large  AIC 
        
 

































































































      
Notes: The Table shows the estimates of the coefficient k of model (2) using labor and services costs scaled by the pre-
assignment sales. Costs are accumulated over the first 3 years after the assignment (included that of the assignment). 
Robust standard errors clustered by score in round brackets. AIC: Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)  Small [Large] 
firms are those falling in the first [second] half of the distribution of the value added. See, also, the notes to Table 5. 
*, **,***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.   
  44
Table 7 




(st. errors)  Variable 
Small Large     
        





































RESULTS FOR SERVICES:  
EFFECT OF THE PROGRAM ON TOTAL INVESTMENT/SALES 
Model (1)  Model (2) 
Order of  
polynomial 
β AIC  β - Small  β - Large  AIC 
       
 
A. Full sample 
0 0.032 
(0.025) 



























B. Local estimates: Wide-window sample 
0 0.030 
(0.032) 



















Mean (st. dev.) for 









Notes: The table shows the estimates of the coefficient  of model (1) and (2) on service firms. See the notes to Tables 3 and 5. 
Number of observations: 111 in Panel A;  67  in Panel B.  










Sales  Order of  
polynomial 
Low High  AIC Low  High AIC Low  High AIC 
                
 


























































































































Notes: The table shows the estimates of coefficients j of model (4). Coverage ratio = Grant/Planned investment. High (Low) identifies firms that 
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Table 10 
ROBUSTNESS I: ESTIMATIONS WITH COVARIATES 
Dependent variable: Total investment/Sales 
 
Model (1) + covariates  Model (2) + covariates 
Order of  
polynomial 
β AIC  β - Small  β - Large  AIC 
       
 
A. Full sample 
0 0.015 
(0.012) 



























B. Local estimates: Wide-window sample 
0 0.021 
(0.018) 




















C. Local estimates: Narrow-window sample 
0 0.035 
(0.022) 



















Notes: The table shows the estimates of the coefficient  of model (1) and (2) on industrial firms including as covariates 2-
digit sector dummies, gross operative margin/value added, own capital/debts, ROA, cash flow/sales, total assets, financial 
costs/debts all referred to the pre-treatment period. See, also, the notes to tables 3 and 5. 
*, **,***: significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 11 
ROBUSTNESS II: DISCONTINUITY OF COVARIATES  
ROA  Net worth assets/Debts  Cash flow/Sales  Interest costs/Debts 
Order of  polynomial 
Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large 
          
 


















































B. Local estimates: Wide-window sample 

















































C. Local estimates: Narrow-window sample 
















































Notes: The table shows the estimates of the coefficients k of model (2) using different outcome variables. See, also, the notes to Tables 3 and 5. Table 12 
ROBUSTNESS III: FURTHER CHECKS 
 
1. Tests for discontinuity in the pre-program period 
 
Total  investment/Sales  Intangible investment/Sales  Tangible investment/Sales 
Order of  
polynomial 
Small Large Small Large Small Large 
        
 
















































































































2. F-Tests for discontinuities at different cut-off points 
 
Order of  
polynomial  Total  investment/Sales  Total  investment/Capital  Total  investment/Assets 




















         
Notes: The first section of the table shows the estimates of the coefficients k of model (2) using investment of 2 years before the 
implementation of the program. Robust standard errors clustered by score in round brackets. The second section shows the F- tests for 
the null hypothesis that a full set of score dummies interacted with the small-firms dummy included in the model (2) are equal to zero. 
The full sample has been used. P-value in round brackets. See, also, the notes to Tables 3 and 5. Appendix 
Figure A1 
 
MAP OF ITALY WITH THE AREA COVERED BY THE POLICY IN GREEN 




PAPERS ON R&D INCENTIVES PUBLISHED IN THE LAST DECADE (1) 
Articles Country  Outcome 
variable  Methodology Results 
       
Lerner (1999)  United States  Employment, 
sales  Matching Positive  effect 
Wallsten (2000)  United States  Employment, 
investment 
Instrumental 
variables  No effect 
Busom (2000)  Spain  Employment, 
investment  Structural model  Positive effect 
Branstetter and Sakakibara (2002)  Japan  Innovation 
activity  Matching Positive  effect 
Lach (2002)  Israel  Investment  Diff-in-diff with 
controls  No effect  
Almus and Czarnitzki (2003)  Eastern Germany Investment  Matching  Positive  effect 
Hujer and Radic (2005)  Germany  Innovation 
activity  Matching No  effect 
Gonzalez et al. (2005)  Spain  Investment  Instrumental 
variables  Positive effect 
Gorg and Strobl (2007)  Ireland Investment  Matching 
Positive effect  
just for smaller 
grants 




Matching No  effect 
Hussinger (2008)  Germany  Investment  Two-step 
selection models  Positive effect 
(1) The table reports the studies that examined the effect of firms’ subsidies for R&D; those evaluating the impact of tax 
incentives are not included. 
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Table A2 
DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BY SECTOR AND SIZE: PERCENTAGES 
Small Large 
Sector 
Treated Untreated  Treated  Untreated 
       
Food, beverages and tobacco 5.0  5.1  8.9 4.5 
Textile, wearing and apparel, leather 
products 
2.5 1.7  0.7  4.5 
Paper, printing and publishing 2.5  1.7 0.0  0.0 
Chemicals products  10.9  5.1  11.1  13.6 
Non-metallic mineral products  1.7  5.1  5.9  2.3 
Basic metal industries 9.2  10.2  6.7  13.6 
Machinery and equipment  59.7  62.7  55.6  47.7 
Transport equipment  3.4  3.4  8.9  2.3 
Other manufacturing industries, 
wood and wood furniture 
3.4 1.7  0.0  11.4 
Construction 1.7  3.4  2.2  0.0 
Total industrial firms 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table A3 
PRE-ASSIGNMENT MEAN-DIFFERENCES BY FIRMS’ SIZE  
Standard errors in brackets 
Small Firms  Large firms 
Variables 
All  50% cut off 
sample 
35% cut off 
sample  All  50% cut off 
sample 
35% cut off 
sample 





























































































































































Number of firms  178  90  58  179  81  57 
*, **,***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.  
Table A4 
OUTCOME VARIABLE: LOG (EMPLOYMENT) 
Baseline model (1)  Kernel regressions (2) 
Order of 
polynomial 
All firms  Small firms  Large firms  All firms  Small firms  Large firms 
        
 























































































        
Notes: The Table reports the differences of the outcome variable between recipient and non-recipient firms estimated at the cut-off score 
(score=75). Employment is accumulated over the first 3 years after the assignment (including that of the assignment). Polynomial of order 0 is 
the difference in mean between treated and untreated. Small (large) firms are those with value added below (above) the median. 
(1) In panel A1 observations are 263; in panel A2 they are 118. 
(2) We estimated the model using the Epanechnikov kernel combined with two bandwidths ( 30 and  15 points around the cut-off) and 
various polynomials. In panel B1 observations are 263; in panel B2 firms are 271. Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) clustered by 
score in round brackets. 
*, **,***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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Table A5 
RESULTS OF KERNEL REGRESSIONS  

































                 


















































































































































































































































                 
Notes: The Table reports the differences of the outcome variable between recipient and non-recipient firms estimated at the cut-off score (score=75). All the variables are accumulated over the first 3 years after the 
assignment (including that of the assignment) and scaled by sales in the pre-assignment year. We estimated the model using the Epanechnikov kernel combined with two bandwidths (30 and 15) and various polynomials. 
The full sample includes 341 firms in panel A and 271 in panel B. Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications) clustered by score in round brackets. Polynomial of order 0 is the difference in mean between treated and 
untreated. Small (large) firms are those with value added below (above) the median. 
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